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Abstract
Information flow security in a multilevel system aims at guaranteeing that no high
level information is revealed to low level users, even in the presence of any possible
malicious process. This requirement could be stronger than necessary when some
knowledge about the environment (context) in which the process is going to run is
available. To relax this requirement we introduce the notion of secure contexts for
a class of processes. This notion is parametric with respect to both the observation
equivalence and the operation used to characterize the low level view of a process.
As observation equivalence we consider the cases of weak bisimulation and trace
equivalence. We describe how to build secure contexts in these cases and we show
that two well-known security properties, named BNDC and NDC, are just special
instances of our general notion.
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1 Introduction
The problem of protecting data in a multilevel system is one of the relevant issues in
computer security. Information flow security properties have been proposed as a means
to ensure confidentiality of classified information. These properties impose constraints
on information flow among different groups of entities with different security levels.
Often only two groups are considered and are labelled with the security levels high (H)
and low (L). The condition is that no information should flow from H to L.
An early attempt to formalize the absence of information flow was the concept of
noninterference proposed in the seminal paper by Goguen and Meseguer [11]. Intu-
itively, to establish that information does not flow from high to low it is sufficient to
establish that high behavior has no effect on what low level users can observe, i.e., the
low level view of the system is independent of high behavior. Noninterference has been
further developed in different settings such as programming languages [38, 36, 35, 3],
trace models [20, 21], process calculi [30, 28, 33, 8, 6, 14], probabilistic models [2, 7],
timed models [13], cryptographic protocols [1, 9, 4].
Noninterference aims at characterizing the complete absence of any information
flow or, indeed stronger, the absence of any causal flow. As already noticed by many
authors [29, 26, 27, 33, 16] this is too strong for practical applications. For instance,
when two high level users communicate through an encrypted channel, a low level user
may only know that a communication occurred. In this case there is a causal flow
but not a (significant) information flow. More generally, there are situations referred
to as downgrading, in which trusted entities are permitted to move information from
high to low. Thus the policy requirements may admit restricted/controlled information
flows. Sometimes it is more a question of functionality. Absolute noninterference can
hardly ever be achieved in real systems. In realistic situations high level input interferes
with low level output all the time [32]. Typically strict noninterference simply is not
feasible due to clashes of resource which it demands. Consider a simple device that
allows information flow from low to high but not from high to low. Such a device is
feasible from a theoretical point of view only, in practice some causal flow from high
to low is necessary to regulate the flow from low to high and avoid buffer overflow.
To deal with restricted/controlled information flows the notion of intransitive non-
interference has been introduced (see [29, 26]). Flows from the high level to a trusted
part and flows from the trusted part to the low level are admissible since the trusted part
takes care of controlling them, while a direct flow from high to low is not allowed.
Total noninterference could be stronger than necessary also when some knowledge
about the environment (context) in which the process is going to run is available. The
following example illustrates one such situation. Consider a process representing a
client of a bank using his card in an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) to take money
from his account. When the card is inserted in the ATM the code of the card is read,
then the client can write his PIN code, and if the PIN is correct he can ask for the money.
All the actions involved concern the exchange of confidential (high level) information
between the client and the bank. A correct ATM should read the codes, and if they
are correct, it should give the money to the client. Since all the data are protected, no
(high) information is revealed to an external observer; hence we can assume that the
ATM context is secure for the client. Imagine now that a maintenance engineer puts
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a laptop inside the ATM. The laptop records all the card numbers and the PINs of the
ATM’s users. We can also imagine that once the confidential data have been captured
the laptop send them to the bank so that the client receives the money and does not
suspect the fraud. Clearly, this context is not secure for the client. However, this does
not mean that we give up using cards and ATMs. We just want to be sure to use them
in secure contexts.
In this paper we introduce the notion of secure contexts for a class of processes
to generalize noninterference to manage the cases illustrated above. The notion of
secure contexts for a class of processes is parametric with respect to both an observa-
tion equivalence relation and an operation used to characterize the low level view of a
process. We consider instances with weak bisimulation and trace equivalence as obser-
vation equivalence. We show how to build secure contexts and prove that the security
properties known as BNDC and NDC (see [8]) are just special instances of our general
security notion.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the SPA language and its
semantics, and we introduce contexts as particular SPA expressions. Secure contexts
for a class of processes are introduced in Section 3. They are illustrated by means
of examples. In Sections 4 and 5 we study two instances of our general definition
through weak bisimulation and trace equivalence, respectively. In Section 6 we discuss
some related works and show how downgrading can be modelled by means of secure
contexts. Finally, in Section 7 we draw some conclusions.
2 Basic Notions
The Security Process Algebra (SPA) [8] is a variation of Milner’s CCS [23], where the
set of visible actions is partitioned into high level actions and low level ones in order to
specify multilevel systems. SPA syntax is based on the same elements as CCS, i.e.: a
set L of visible actions such that L = I[O where I = fa;b; : : :g is a set of input actions
and O = fa¯; ¯b; : : :g is a set of output actions; a special action τ which models internal
computations, not visible outside the system; a complement function ¯ : L ! L , such
that ¯a¯ = a, for all a 2 L . Act = L [fτg is the set of all actions. Function ¯ is extended
to Act by defining τ¯ = τ. The set of visible actions is partitioned into two sets, H and
L, of high and low actions such that H = H and L = L. The syntax of SPA terms is
defined as follows:
T ::= 0 j Z j a:T j T +T j T jT j T n v j T [ f ℄ j recZ:T
where Z is a variable, a 2 Act, v  L , f : Act ! Act is a renaming function such that
f (α¯) = f (α), f (τ) = τ, f (H) H [fτg, and f (L)  L[fτg.
We apply the standard notions of free and bound (occurrences of) variables in a
SPA term. More precisely, all the occurrences of the variable Z in recZ:T are bound;
while Z is free in a term T if there is an occurrence of Z in T which is not bound.
Definition 2.1. A SPA process is a SPA term without free variables. We denote by E
the set of all SPA processes, ranged over by E;F; : : :, and by EH the set of all high level
processes, i.e., those constructed only using actions belonging to H [fτg.
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The operational semantics of SPA processes is given in terms of Labelled Transition
Systems (LTS, for short). In particular, the LTS (E ;Act;!), whose states are processes,
is defined by structural induction as the least relation generated by the axioms and infe-
rence rules reported in Table 1, where a is an action of Act, while l belongs to L .
Intuitively, 0 is the empty process that does nothing; a:E is a process that can
perform an action a and then behaves as E; E1 +E2 represents the nondeterministic
choice between the two processes E1 and E2; E1jE2 is the parallel composition of E1
and E2, where executions are interleaved, possibly synchronized on complementary
input/output actions, producing the silent action τ; E n v is a process E prevented from
performing actions in v 1; E[ f ℄ is the process E whose actions are renamed via the
relabelling function f ; recZ:T [Z℄ is the recursive term which can perform all the actions
of the term obtained by substituting recZ:T [Z℄ to the place-holder Z in the context T [Z℄.
To define security properties it is also useful to introduce the hiding operator, =, of
CSP which can be defined as a relabelling as follows: for a given set v  L , E=v 
E[ fv℄ where fv(a) = a if a 62 v and fv(a) = τ if a 2 v. In practice, E=v turns all actions
in v into internal τ’s.
A SPA term with free variables can be seen as an environment with holes (the free
occurrences of its variables) in which other SPA terms can be inserted. The result
of this substitution is still a SPA term, which could be a process. For instance, in
the term h:0j(`:X + τ:0) we can replace the variable X with the process ¯h:0 obtaining
the process h:0j(`:¯h:0+ τ:0); or we can replace X by the term a:Y obtaining the term
h:0j(`:a:Y + τ:0). When we consider a SPA term as an environment we call it context.
Definition 2.2. A SPA context, ranged over by C;D; : : :, is a SPA term in which free
variables may occur.
We can also consider a context as a derived SPA constructor. In fact it can be
used to build SPA terms from sets of SPA terms. Its arity is determined by the number
of its free variables. For instance X jX can be seen as a constructor of arity 1 which
transforms any process E into the parallel composition with itself, EjE .
Given a context C, we use the notation C[Y1; : : : ;Yn℄ to stress the fact that we
are interested only in the free occurrences of the variables Y1; : : : ;Yn in C. The term
C[T1; : : : ;Tn℄ is obtained from C[Y1; : : : ;Yn℄ by replacing all the free occurrences of
Y1; : : : ;Yn with the terms T1; : : : ;Tn, respectively. For instance, we can write C[X ℄ 
h:0j(`:X + τ:0) or D[X ℄  (`:X + τ:0)jY or C0[X ℄  Y jh:0. Hence, the notation C[¯h:0℄
stands for h:0j(`:¯h:0+ τ:0), while D[¯h:0℄ (`:¯h:0+ τ:0)jY and C0[¯h:0℄  Y jh:0. Note
that the notation C[Y1; : : : ;Yn℄ implies neither that all the variables Y1; : : : ;Yn occur free
in the context nor that they include all the variables occurring free in the context. Note
also that if W is a variable not occurring in recZ:C[Z℄ and we replace all the occur-
rences of Z in recZ:C[Z℄ by W we obtain the process recW:C[W ℄ (α-conversion) which
is semantically equivalent to recZ:C[Z℄. Nevertheless, the two terms recZ:C[Z℄ and
recW:C[W ℄ represents two different contexts (e.g., if C  a:Z + b:W then recZ:C[Z℄
and recW:C[W ℄ denote different terms).
The concept of observation equivalence is used to establish equalities among pro-
cesses and it is based on the idea that two systems have the same semantics if and only
1Note that in CCS the operator n requires that the actions of E n v do not belong to v[ v¯.
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if they cannot be distinguished by an external observer. This is obtained by defining
an equivalence relation over E equating two processes when they are indistinguish-
able. In this paper we consider the relations named weak bisimulation, B, and trace
equivalence,T .
Let us first introduce the following auxiliary notations. If t = a1   an 2 Act and
E a1!  an! E 0, then we write E t! E 0 and we say that E 0 is reachable from E . We also
write E t=) E 0 if E( τ!) a1! ( τ!)    ( τ!) an! ( τ!)E 0 where ( τ!) denotes a (possibly
empty) sequence of τ labelled transitions. If t 2 Act, then tˆ 2 L  is the sequence
gained by deleting all occurrences of τ from t. As a consequence, E aˆ=) E 0 stands for
E a=) E 0 if a 2 L , and for E( τ!)E 0 if a = τ (note that τ=) requires at least one τ
labelled transition while τˆ=) means zero or more τ labelled transitions).
The weak bisimulation relation [23] equates two processes if they are able to mu-
tually simulate their behavior step by step. Weak bisimulation does not care about
internal τ actions.
Definition 2.3 (Weak Bisimulation). A binary relation R  E E over processes is
a weak bisimulation if (E;F) 2 R implies, for all a 2 Act,
 if E a! E 0, then there exists F 0 such that F aˆ=) F 0 and (E 0;F 0) 2 R ;
 if F a! F 0, then there exists E 0 such that E aˆ=) E 0 and (E 0;F 0) 2 R .
Two processes E;F 2 E are weakly bisimilar, denoted by E B F , if there exists a
weak bisimulation R containing the pair (E;F).
The relation B is the largest weak bisimulation and it is an equivalence relation.
The trace equivalence relation equates two processes if they have the same sets of
traces, again, without considering the τ actions.
Definition 2.4 (Trace Equivalence). For any process E 2 E the set of traces Tr(E)
associated with E is defined as follows
Tr(E) = ft 2 L  j 9E 0E t=) E 0g:
Two processes E;F 2 E are trace equivalent, denoted by E T F , if Tr(E) = Tr(F).
Trace equivalence is less demanding than weak bisimulation, hence if two pro-
cesses are weakly bisimilar, then they are also trace equivalent.
Following [23] we extend binary relations on processes to contexts as follows.
Definition 2.5 (Relations on Contexts). Let R be a binary relation over processes,
i.e., a subset of E  E . Let C and D be two contexts and fY1; : : : ;Yng be a set of
variables which include all the free variables of C and D. We say that CR D if for all
set of processes fE1; : : : ;Eng it holds
C[E1; : : : ;En℄ R D[E1; : : : ;En℄:
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In the case of weak bisimulation, applying the above definition we have that two
contexts are weakly bisimilar if all the processes obtained by instantiating their vari-
ables are pair-wise bisimilar. For instance, using our notation, the contexts C[X ℄ 
a:X + τ:Y and D[X ℄ a:τ:X + τ:Y are weakly bisimilar since for all E;F 2 E it holds
a:E+τ:F B a:τ:E +τ:F . Notice that not all the free variables of C and D were explicit
in the notation C[X ℄ and D[X ℄. However, Definition 2.5 requires the instantiation of all
their free variables.
3 Secure Contexts
In this section we extend the concept of noninterference by introducing a general no-
tion of secure contexts for a class of processes. The idea is that a context represents
the environment interacting with processes during their execution. For instance, in Fig-
ure 1 on the left we represent a database DB, containing both confidential and public
information and running in a context which comprises a firewall, trojan horses and in-
terfaces allowing the users to interact with the database. The security notion we intend
to capture aims at ensuring that the interaction between the context and the database is
transparent with respect to the high level information for low level users. This means
that low level users cannot distinguish between the whole system (on the left of Figure
1) and the system where the database contains only low level information (on the right
in Figure 1). As an immediate consequence we have that no confidential information
of the database is revealed to the low level observers. Moreover, since the low level
database cannot interact with high level users through the interfaces in the context, as
a side effect we get that also the high level information contained in the context is not
revealed.
The notion of secure contexts for a class of processes presented below is parametric
with respect to an operation  l used to characterize the low level behavior, El , of a
process E , and an observation equivalence used to equate two processes. We denote
byl the relation on the low level views of processes, i.e., E l F stands for El Fl .
Definition 3.1 (Secure Contexts for a Class of Processes). Let  and  l be an ob-
servation equivalence relation and an operation on processes, respectively. Let C be a
class of contexts, P be a class of processes, and X be a variable. The class C is secure
for the class P with respect to the variable X if
for all C[X ℄ 2 C and for all E 2 P ; C[E℄l C[El ℄:
In this definition the variable X is used to determine the “holes” in C which are
intended to be filled in by E . Recall that X might not occur free in C. In this case C is
trivially secure (by reflexivity of ). Moreover, in C there can be other free variables
different from X . In this case we have to apply Definition 2.5 and instantiate the other
free variables in all the possible ways.
EXAMPLE 3.2. Let  and  l be an observation equivalence relation and an operation
on processes, respectively. Let P = fEg and C = f`:X + `:Y + h:Yg, with ` 2 L and
h 2 H. To prove that C is secure for P with respect to the variable X we have to prove
that for all F 2 E it holds `:E+`:F+h:F l `:El +`:F+h:F . Similarly, to prove that C
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is secure for P with respect to the variable Y we have to prove that for all F 2 E it holds
`:F + `:E +h:E l `:F + `:El +h:El. The class C is trivially secure for P with respect
to the variable Z, since for all F;G2 E it holds that `:F+`:G+h:Gl `:F+`:G+h:G.
In the rest of this paper when we say that C is secure for P we are implicitly
referring to the variable X .
The intended meaning of our security definition is that a low level observer cannot
distinguish the interactions between a process E 2 P and a context C 2 C from the in-
teractions between the low level view El of E and C. If, accordingly with our intuition,
El represents the low level behavior of E then our definition is clearly in the spirit of
the noninterference schema proposed in [11]. In the literature the low level view of
a process is usually modelled using either restriction or hiding of high level actions.
The first case corresponds to disallowing any external synchronization on high level
actions; the second case simulates the situation in which all possible synchronizations
are performed.
Let us analyze the definition in the case in which only one process and one context
are involved. The definition can be read from two points of view: security for the
process and security for the context. On the one hand, if a context C is secure for a
process E , then E can safely interact with C (security for the process), since C is not
able to reveal to the low level users any high level information contained in E . In fact,
it is revealed only the information that would be revealed by the interaction with El . On
the other hand, if a context C is secure for a process E , then C can safely interact with
E (security for the context). In fact, E is able to reveal the same information which
could be revealed by El that cannot interact with the high level actions of C. In the
introduction we gave a first example fitting with the first situation. Here we add two
more examples to explain the two points of view.
EXAMPLE 3.3 (SECURITY FOR THE PROCESSES). Suppose that Wholesaler ltd is a
wholesale company which does not sell its products directly to the final users but only
to the shopkeepers. Thus the price of its products can be seen as a confidential data that
only the Wholesaler’s customers (shopkeepers) are allowed to know. On the other hand
the company advertises its products both to shopkeepers (high level) and to potential
(low level) users. Consider a Java applet E downloadable from the site of Wholesaler
ltd which should allow the shopkeepers to get confidential data like prices and the rest
of the world to get a product list with generic information about the products. The
applet opens a window with two buttons: the first button allows to read the product list,
while the second one allows to read the price list, provided a password is inserted. Let
PWD SHOPKEEPER be the high level action representing the fact that E is waiting for
a password from a shopkeeper before showing the price list. We assume that this is the
only protection for the confidential data in E. The applet E can be represented by the
following SPA process,
PWD SHOPKEEPER:PRICES+ PRODUCTS
Wholesaler does not want the applet to be executed on a machine (context) which
reveals some high level information (e.g., the price list) to non authorized users. Let us
consider two possible contexts. Let C1 be the machine of the high level user in which
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the password has been stored. Then C1 can be represented by a term of the form
X jPWD SHOPKEEPER:0:
In this case high level information can be revealed: when a low level user interacts
with C1[E℄, he (she) can read the price list. Hence, C1 cannot be considered secure for
E . Another more involved context is, for instance, a machine C2 shared between high
and low level users such that only high level users (shopkeepers) can read the price list,
while low level ones can read the product list:
PWD HIGH:(X jPWD SHOPKEEPER:0)+ PWD LOW:X :
In this case the flexibility of the context is obtained by splitting C2 into two non-
deterministic components: the first one manages the interaction with high level users
and has in memory the shopkeeper’s password; the second one interacts with low level
users and does not provide any password. Note that if a high level user interacts with
C2[E℄ by inserting the password PWD HIGH, the PRICES component becomes accessi-
ble to low level observers. This can be seen as the possibility for the high level user
to downgrade (see Section 6) the level of the information stored in the price-list. Intu-
itively, the process E described here does not satisfy information flow security proper-
ties such as noninterference [25]. However, whenever downgrading is a high level user
decision, it is reasonable to assume that the context C2 is secure for E .
EXAMPLE 3.4 (SECURITY FOR THE CONTEXTS). Mr Earner has on his own machine
C some files containing the information about his investments. He would like to check
whether they are profitable and, if they are not, to have some suggestions about how
to change them. He installed on his machine a program which is able to check on the
stock market through an Internet connection, reads his investments files and performs
some computations to determine whether the investments are profitable or not. If the
investments are going bad, the program checks again on the stock market, for better
opportunities. The second check on the stock market is recommended since it allows to
use the last quotations for computing suggestions (it is preferable not to use the cached
stock market’s quotations for this operation). Obviously Mr Earner does not want that
someone knows if his investments are good or not. The machine of Mr Earner can be
in one of the following states:
X jGOOD:0 or X jBAD:SUGGESTIONS:0
which we assume to correctly represent the reality of his investments. In the first case
Mr Earner investments are good and this fact can be revealed through the high level
output GOOD. In the second case Mr Earner investments are bad, hence after the high
level output his machine is ready to have in input some suggestions through the high
level input action SUGGESTIONS. Mr Earner wants both contexts be secure with re-
spect to his investment program. Let us assume that Mr Earner investments are good,
i.e., we consider the first context2. Let E1 be the following program
CHECK:(GOOD:0+ BAD.CHECK:SUGGESTIONS:0);
2All the considerations which follow hold also for the second context.
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where the only low level action is the input CHECK. By observing that E1 has checked a
second time on the stock marked, a low level observer could be able to deduce that Mr
Earner’s investments are bad. Hence, in this case the context representing Mr Earner’s
machine is not secure with respect to E1.
It is clear that in order to get a process such that Mr Earner’s machine is secure
with respect to it, a CHECK action after the GOOD one should be added. However, with
the process
CHECK:(GOOD.CHECK:0+ BAD.CHECK:SUGGESTIONS:0)
the context is still not secure even if the only information which is revealed to the low
level user is that a high level action has been performed but not which one. This is due
to the fact that our security property is based on classical noninterference [11] and thus
it disallows any direct or indirect flow of confidential information. To allow restrict
information flow we need to opportunely redesign the processes. For instance, in this
case it is sufficient to add the masking component CHECK:0. The resulting program E2
CHECK:(GOOD.CHECK:0 + BAD.CHECK:SUGGESTIONS:0+ CHECK:0 )
is now secure according to our definition. Its behavior recalls the case of military radio
transmissions. In order to avoid that someone knows when some information has been
transmitted, every n instants a message is sent. Only one of the messages contains the
real information.
Another possibility to allow restricted flows is that of designing E2 by using down-
grading actions as described in Section 6.1.
Finally, if the market is “stable” and the elaboration of the information in Mr
Earner’s file is “fast”, the following program E3 can be used
CHECK:(GOOD:0+ BAD:SUGGESTIONS:0):
It performs the low level input only once before analyzing the situation of the invest-
ments and gives its suggestions using the cached data. Also in this case, Mr Earner’s
machine is secure with respect to this investment program E3.
When the class C has only one element C we say that C is secure for P . Similarly,
in the case in which P has only one element E we say that the class C is secure for the
process E . If a context is secure for a class P of processes, then it is secure also for all
the subclasses of P . Analogously, if a class of contexts C is secure for a process E , then
all the subclasses of C are secure for E . In the general case we obtain the following
result.
Proposition 3.5. Let C1  C2 be two classes of contexts, P1  P2 be two classes of
processes, and X be a variable. If C2 is secure for P2 with respect to X, then C1 is
secure for P1 with respect to X.
Proof. Let C2 be secure for P2 with respect to X . Since P1  P2, then C2 is also secure
for P1 with respect to X . Moreover, since C1  C2, we get that C1 is secure for P1 with
respect to X .
9
Definition 3.1 introduces a general security notion. To analyze it more concretely it
is necessary to instantiate the observation equivalence  and the operation  l defining
the low level view of processes. A reasonable requirement to get useful instances is
that of using a decidable equivalence and a computable operation.
In the next two sections we consider two instances of our framework. We study the
properties of these instances and their connections with some security notions coming
from the literature. In particular, we consider two observation equivalences, named
weak bisimulation and trace equivalence. The choice of the observation equivalence
clearly depends on the application of interest. In [9] the authors study security prop-
erties of cryptographic protocols based on noninterference and they discriminate be-
tween those properties for which trace equivalence is sufficient, e.g., authentication, se-
crecy, and integrity, and those properties for which deadlock-sensitive equivalences like
bisimulation and testing equivalence are necessary, e.g., fairness and non-repudiation.
4 First Instance: Weak Bisimulation and Restriction
We analyze the properties of our security definition by instantiating the observation
equivalence  and the operation  l as follows:  is B (weak bisimulation) and  l is
 nH (restriction on high level actions). Using such an instance, a class of contexts C is
secure for a class of processes P with respect to a variable X if
for all C[X ℄ 2 C and for all E 2 P ; C[E℄nH B C[E nH℄nH:
In the rest of this section we refer to this instance of our security property.
EXAMPLE 4.1. Consider again Example 3.3 where confidential data are protected only
by the password PWD SHOPKEEPER. Assume that PRODUCTS and PRICES show the
list of products and of prices to any (low or high) user asking for them. In SPA this
behavior is obtained by creating two output actions for both the product and the price
list, one for the low level users and the other for the high level ones.
PRODUCTS  PROD LIST H:0+ PROD LIST L:0
PRICES  PRICE LIST H:0+ PRICE LIST L:0:
C1[E℄nH  τ:PRICE LIST L:0+ PROD LIST L:0 is not weakly bisimilar to C1[E nH℄n
H  PROD LIST L:0. Indeed, a low level user interacting with C1[E℄ can read the price
list, thus leaking confidential data. On the other hand, both C2[E℄nH and C2[E nH℄nH
are bisimilar to PWD LOW:PROD LIST L:0, according to the intuition that C2 is secure
for E .
EXAMPLE 4.2. In Example 3.4 we said that both the contexts representing Mr Earner’s
machine are secure with respect to the second program E2. Indeed, E2 never reveals to
low level users the situation of Mr Earner’s investments, since a second check on the
market is performed in any case. For instance, using the first context of Example 3.4
we obtain that C[E2℄ nH  CHECK:(τ:CHECK:0 + CHECK:0) is weakly bisimilar to
C[E2 nH℄nH  CHECK:CHECK:0, hence the security property holds.
The third program E3 of Example 3.4 satisfies that C[E3℄nH B C[E3 nH℄nH for
both the contexts, as can be easily checked.
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Using this first instance we find an interesting connection between our security def-
inition and the security property known as BNDC and proposed by Focardi and Gorrieri
[8]. The security property BNDC is based on the idea of checking the system against
all high level potential interactions, representing every possible high level malicious
program. In particular, a process E is BNDC if for every high level process Π a low
level user cannot distinguish E from (EjΠ), i.e., if Π cannot interfere with the low level
execution of E .
Definition 4.3 (BNDC). Let E 2 E . E 2 BNDC if for all Π 2 EH ,
E nH B (EjΠ)nH:
The following lemma states that the set of contexts of the form X jΠ with Π 2 EH
characterizes the class of BNDC processes.
Lemma 4.4. Let E 2 E . E 2 BNDC if and only if C[E℄ nH B C[E nH℄ nH for all
contexts C[X ℄ X jΠ, with Π 2 EH .
Proof. ()) If E 2 BNDC, then (EjΠ) nH B E nH. Moreover, E nH is always in
BNDC and E nH nH B E nH, hence (E nHjΠ) B E nH nH B E nH. So by
transitivity of B, we obtain that (EjΠ)nH B (E nHjΠ)nH.
(() Since E nH is always in BNDC and E nH nH B E nH, we have (EjΠ)nH B
(E nHjΠ)nH B E nH.
EXAMPLE 4.5. The process E in Example 3.3 is not a BNDC process. In fact, the
context X jPWD SHOPKEEPER:0 is a context of the form X jΠ with Π 2 EH and it is not
secure for E , hence by Lemma 4.4 we obtain that E is not BNDC. However, as shown
in Example 4.1, there are complex contexts in which E can be safely executed.
Both processes E2 and E3 of Example 3.4 can be proved to be BNDC process.
In Subsection 4.1 we identify two classes of contexts which are secure for all the
processes. Then, in Subsection 4.2 we concentrate on classes of processes character-
ized by some security notions (basically we will consider subclasses of BNDC) and
analyze whether there exist larger classes of secure contexts for them.
4.1 B Instance: Secure Contexts for a generic class P
Our first result can be easily proved by applying the definitions.
Theorem 4.6. Let P be a class of processes. Let C be the class of contexts containing
 all F 2 E ;
 all variables;
 all contexts of the form ∑li2L li:Ci +∑h j2H h j:D j, with the Ci’s secure for P with
respect to X;
 all contexts C n v and C[ f ℄ with C secure for P with respect to X.
Then C is secure for P with respect to X.
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Proof.
 Each F 2 E is secure for P , since F nH B F nH.
 A variable is secure for E 2 P , since E nH B E nH nH.
 Let C[X ℄  ∑li2L li:Ci +∑h j2H h j:D j, with Ci secure for P for all i. We prove
that C[X ℄ is secure for E 2 P . If C[E℄ nH a! C0, then there exists i such that
a = li 2 L, and C0Ci[E℄nH. So we have that C[E nH℄nH
a
!Ci[E nH℄nH, with
Ci[E℄nH B Ci[E nH℄nH, by hypothesis on Ci[X ℄. The case C[E nH℄nH
a
!C0
is similar.
 Let E 2 P . If C[E℄ nH B C[E nH℄ nH, then C[E℄ nH n v B C[E nH℄ nH n v,
hence C[E℄n vnH B C[E nH℄n vnH.
 Let C[X ℄ be secure for E 2 P and consider C[X ℄[ f ℄, where f maps high actions
in H[fτg and low actions in L[fτg. If C[E℄[ f ℄nH a!C0, then C0 C00[ f ℄, there
exists b2 L[fτg such that a = f (b) and C[E℄nH b!C00. Hence, C[E nH℄nH ˆb)
C000 B C00, and C[E nH℄[ f ℄nH aˆ)C000[ f ℄B C00[ f ℄. So C[X ℄[ f ℄ is secure for E .
Notice that it does not hold that if C and D are secure for P , then CjD is secure for
P . This is a consequence of the fact that we do not know anything about the class P .
EXAMPLE 4.7. Consider the class P = fEg where E  h:`:0+ ¯h:0. The context X is
secure for P (see Theorem 4.6), but the context X jX is not secure for P .
Observe that Theorem 4.6 does not provide a decidability result. For instance, if
we know that C is secure for P , then we can deduce that C n v is secure for P , but, in
general, we cannot use Theorem 4.6 to prove that C 2 C and thus it is secure for P .
Hereafter we characterize a decidable class of contexts which are secure for all the
processes (i.e., for a generic class P ). Obviously we want the class to be as large as
possible. In order to obtain the decidability of the class we require a compositionality
structure, i.e., contexts are built only using sub-contexts which belong to the class. In
order to ensure security we do not use the parallel composition when the context is not
a closed term (see Example 4.7).
Definition 4.8 (The Class C s). Let C s be the class of contexts which contains all the
SPA processes, all the variables, and is closed with respect to the following construc-
tors: ∑i2I ai:Yi (with ai 2 Act), Y n v, Y [ f ℄, recZ:Y .
Notice that if C[Y ℄;D 2 C s, then we have C[D℄ 2 C s.
The class C s is decidable, in fact it is easy to define a proof system whose proofs
correspond exactly to the constructions of the contexts in C s.
EXAMPLE 4.9. The contexts X , Y and Z belong to C s. Hence, by using the constructor
a:Y1 + b:Y2 + c:Y3, the context a:X + b:Y + c:Z belongs to C s, and then, by using the
recY:W constructor, the context recY:(a:X +b:Y + c:Z) is in C s.
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All the contexts in C s are secure for all the processes, as it is stated by the next
theorem. The following lemmas are used in its proof.
Lemma 4.10. The relation B is a congruence in the class C s with respect to its con-
structors.
Proof. The only non trivial case is “Recursion”. Let C;D 2 C s be weak bisimilar,
we prove that recY:C B recY:D. Without loss of generality we assume C[Y ℄ and
D[Y ℄ with at most the single free variable Y . The generalization follows from Defi-
nition 2.5. In fact, suppose that C[Y;Y1 : : :Yn℄B D[Y;Y1 : : :Yn℄, then for any choice of
E1 : : :En 2 E we have C[Y;E1 : : :En℄B D[Y;E1 : : :En℄, and thus recY:C[Y;E1 : : :En℄B
recY:D[Y;E1 : : :En℄; therefore recY:C[Y;Y1 : : :Yn℄B recY:D[Y;Y1 : : :Yn℄.
Let us define the relation S on C s as:
S = f (G[recY:C[Y ℄℄;G[recY:D[Y ℄℄) j
C;D;G 2 C s; C B D; and G contains at most one variableg:
We prove S is a weak bisimulation up to B. From this it follows recY:C[Y ℄ B
recY:D[Y ℄, by taking G X .
We prove that if G[recY:C[Y ℄℄ a ! P then there exist Q;Q0 2 C s with (P;Q0)2 S and
G[recY:D[Y ℄℄ ba=) QB Q0: The converse follows by the symmetry of S .
We prove the claim by induction on the depth of the inference used to obtain
G[recY:C[Y ℄℄ a ! P.
Base. If G[recY:C[Y ℄℄ a ! P with an inference of depth 0, then the rule “Prefix”
has been applied, and G[X ℄  a:G0[X ℄, so P  G0[recY:C[Y ℄℄, with G0 2 C s. Also
G[recY:D[Y ℄℄ a:G0[recY:D[Y ℄℄ a !G0[recY:D[Y ℄℄ and (G0[recY:C[Y ℄℄;G0[recY:D[Y ℄℄)2
S .
Induction. We proceed by cases on the structure of G.
 G 2 E . Trivially G[recY:C[Y ℄℄ G[recY:D[Y ℄℄ G.
 G  X . Then recY:C[Y ℄ a ! P by applying “Recursion” at last step. Therefore
C[recY:C[Y ℄℄ a ! P with a shorter inference. By induction
C[recY:D[Y ℄℄ ba=) QB Q0 with (P;Q0) 2 S :
But C[Y ℄B D[Y ℄ implies D[recY:D[Y ℄℄
ba
=) Q00 B Q: And we conclude
recY:D[Y ℄ ba=) Q000 B Q00 B QB Q0
since D[recY:D[Y ℄℄B recY:D[Y ℄.
 G  ∑i ai:Gi. Then ∑i ai:Gi[recY:C[Y ℄℄ a! P by applying “Sum” at last step.
So ai:Gi[recY:C[Y ℄℄
a
! P. Hence P  Gi[recY:C[Y ℄℄, with Gi 2 C s. By “Sum”,
G[recY:D[Y ℄℄ a! Q Gi[recY:D[Y ℄℄, and (P;Q) 2 S .
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 GG1 nv. Then G1[recY:C[Y ℄℄n
a
! P by applying “Restriction” at last step. So,
P P0 n v, a =2 v and G1[recY:C[Y ℄℄
a
! P0 by a shorter inference. By induction
G1[recY:D[Y ℄℄
ba
=) QB Q0 with (P0;Q0) 2 S :
We conclude G1[recY:D[Y ℄℄n v
ba
=) Qn v B Q0 n v, with (P;Q0 n v) 2 S by con-
struction of S . In fact, (P0;Q0) 2 S implies that there exists a context H[X ℄,
with only a free variable X , such that P0  H[recY:C[Y ℄℄ and Q0 H[recY:D[Y ℄℄.
Hence, P P0 n v H[recY:C[Y ℄℄n v and Q0 n v H[recY:D[Y ℄℄n v.
 G  G1[ f ℄. Then G1[recY:C[Y ℄℄[ f ℄ a! P by applying “Relabelling” at last step.
So P  P0[ f ℄, a = f (a0), and G1[recY:C[Y ℄℄ a
0
! P0 by a shorter inference. By
induction
G1[recY:D[Y ℄℄
ba0
=) QB Q0 with (P0;Q0) 2 S :
By construction of S , we conclude
G1[recY:D[Y ℄℄[ f ℄
[f (a0)
=) Q[ f ℄B Q0[ f ℄ with (P;Q0[ f ℄) 2 S :
 G  recZ:G1[X ;Z℄. Then recZ:G1[recY:C[Y ℄;Z℄
a
! P by applying “Recursion”
at last step. It derives by a shorter inference from
G1[recY:C[Y ℄;recZ:G1[recY:C[Y ℄;Z℄℄
a
! P:
By induction we know that
G1[recY:D[Y ℄;recZ:G1[recY:D[Y ℄;Z℄℄
ba
=) QB Q0 with (P;Q0) 2 S :
Since G1[recY:D[Y ℄;recZ:G1[recY:D[Y ℄;Z℄℄ B recZ:G1[recY:D[Y ℄;Z℄, we can
finally conclude that
G1[recY:D[Y ℄;recZ:G1[recY:D[Y ℄;Z℄℄
ba
=) Q00 B QB Q0:
Lemma 4.11. Let C 2 C s. Then recY:(C nH)nH B (recY:C)nH:
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume C with at most the single free variable Y .
The general case follows by Definition 2.5. Let S be defined as
f(G[(recY:(C nH))℄nH;G[recY:C℄nH) j G[X ℄;C 2 C sg:
If we prove S to be a strong bisimulation, then the Lemma follows by considering
G[X ℄ X .
Note that, since C has at most the single free variable Y , the variables that occur
bound in G do not occur free in C.
In order to prove that S is a strong bisimulation, we are verifying that for any pair
(G[recY:(C nH)℄nH;G[recY:C℄nH) in S
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(1) if G[recY:(C nH)℄nH a! P, then G[recY:C℄nH a! Q with (P;Q) 2 S
(2) if G[recY:C℄nH a! Q, then G[recY:(C nH)℄nH a! P with (P;Q) 2 S .
We proceed by induction on the depth of the inference proof of G[recY:(CnH)℄nH a!P
or G[recY:C℄nH a! Q.
Base. (1) If G[recY:(C nH)℄ nH a! P with an inference of depth 1, then “Re-
striction” and “Prefix” have been applied. So, G[X ℄  a:G0[X ℄ and P  G0[recY:(C n
H)℄nH. By applying the same rules to G[recY:C℄nH we obtain G[recY:C℄nH a! Q
G0[recY:C℄nH with G0 2 C s. Hence (P;Q) 2 S . Case (2) is similar.
Induction step. We proceed by cases on the structure of G[X ℄. In (1) we consider
(recY:(C nH))nH a! P, and in (2) we consider (recY:C)nH a! Q.
 G[X ℄ 2 E . Trivial.
 G[X ℄  X . (1)Then P  P0 nH and C[recY:(C nH)℄ nH a! P0 by a shorter in-
ference. Hence P0 is free from high level action, i.e. P  P0 nH  P0. By
induction, C[(recY:C)℄nH a! Q, and so (recY:C)nH a! Q, with (P0;Q) 2 S . (2)
Then Q  Q0 nH and C[recY:C℄ nH a! Q by a shorter inference. By induction
C[recY:(C nH)℄nH a! P, and so (recY:(C nH))nH a! P, with (P;Q) 2 S .
 G[X ℄  ∑i2I ai:Gi[X ℄. (1) Then there exists i 2 I such that a  ai and P 
Gi[recY:(C nH)℄nH. Hence, G[recY:C℄nH
a
!Q with QGi[recY:C℄nH. From
this we get (P;Q) 2 S . (2) Then a  ai and Q  Gi[recY:C℄ nH. Therefore,
G[recY:(C nH)℄nH a! P with PGi[recY:(C nH)℄nH, this means that (P;Q) 2
S .
 G[X ℄ G1[X ℄n v. Trivial.
 G[X ℄ G1[X ℄[ f ℄. Trivial.
 G[X ℄  recZ:G1[X ;Z℄. (1) Then recZ:G1[recY:(C nH);Z℄ nH a! P and also
G1[recY:(C nH);recZ:G1[recY:(C nH);Z℄℄ nH
a
! P by a shorter inference. By
induction G1[recY:C;recZ:G1[recY:C;Z℄℄ nH
a
! Q and (P;Q) 2 S . Therefore,
recZ:G1[recY:C;Z℄℄ nH
a
! Q, i.e., G[recY:C℄ nH a! Q. (2) Then it holds that
G1[recY:C;recZ:G1[recY:C;Z℄℄ nH
a
! Q, by a shorter inference. By induction
G1[recY:(C nH);recZ:G1[recY:(C nH);Z℄℄nH
a
! P with (P;Q) 2 S . Therefore,
recZ:G1[recY:(C nH);Z℄nH
a
! P.
Lemma 4.12. Let P be a class of processes and C[X ℄2 C s be secure for P with respect
to X. The context recY:C[X ℄ is secure for P with respect to X.
Proof. Our hypothesis is that C[E℄ nH B C[E nH℄ nH and we have to prove that
(recY:C[E℄)nH B (recY:C[E nH℄)nH:
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From the hypothesis and Lemma 4.10 we have that
recY:(C[E℄nH)B recY:(C[E nH℄nH):
By applying “nH” to both members we obtain
recY:(C[E℄nH)nH B recY:(C[E nH℄nH)nH:
Notice that if C[X ℄ 2 C s, then also C[E℄ and C[E nH℄ are in C s. By applying Lemma
4.11 to both members, we get recY:(C[E℄) nH B recY:(C[E nH℄) nH, which is the
thesis.
Theorem 4.13. Let P be a class of processes and X be a variable. If C 2 C s, then C is
secure for P with respect to X.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the structure of the context C.
 C 2 E . We have already proved in Theorem 4.6, that C is secure for P .
 C  Y . Again, this has been proved in Theorem 4.6.
 C  ∑i2I ai:Ci. By induction on the Ci’s and by Lemma 4.10 we have the thesis.
 C C1 n v. By induction on C1 and applying Lemma 4.10 we obtain the thesis.
 C C1[ f ℄. Again, by induction on C1 and Lemma 4.10 we get the thesis.
 C  recY:C1. By induction on C1 and Lemma 4.12 we have the thesis.
EXAMPLE 4.14. Let C be a machine shared between one low level user and one high
level user. When one of the two users is logged, the machine cannot be used by the
other one. The logged user can execute his program or a new program which has
been downloaded from the web. The programs of both the users always terminate and
at the end of their executions the other user can take the control. Let PWD HIGH be
high level action representing the input of the high level user password. Moreover,
let CALL PROG H be the high level call to the program and EX PROG H its execution.
Finally, let CALL WEB H be the high level call to the program downloaded from the
web. All the low level actions are similarly defined. Hence, C has the form
recY: ( PWD HIGH:(CALL PROG H:EX PROG H:Y + CALL WEB H:X )
+ PWD LOW:(CALL PROG L:EX PROG L:Y + CALL WEB L:X ) )
Since C belongs to C s, C is secure for the program coming from the web with respect
to X .
As shown in Example 4.7, without assumptions on the class P the contexts built
using the parallel operator cannot be considered secure. However, as seen in the pre-
vious examples most contexts involve the parallel operator, since it is at the core of
the exchange of information between processes and contexts. For this reason in the
next subsection we concentrate on classes of processes for which we prove that some
contexts involving the parallel operator are secure.
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4.2 B Instance: Secure Contexts for sub-classes of BNDC
As stated in Lemma 4.4 some particular contexts built using the parallel operator are
secure for the class BNDC. Unfortunately, the decidability of BNDC is still an open
problem, and for this reason many sufficient conditions for BNDC have been introduced
and studied in the literature (see [8, 10, 5]). In particular, in [5] three of these sufficient
conditions have been considered and it has been shown that they can be parametrically
characterized with respect to a suitable bisimulation relation. In virtue of Proposition
3.5, all the contexts which are secure for the largest of these three classes, that is the
one named P BNDC, are secure also for the other two classes. P BNDC is nothing
but the persistent version of BNDC. The persistence of P BNDC has been proved to be
fundamental to deal with dynamic contexts (see [10]).
Definition 4.15 (P BNDC). Let E 2 E . E 2 P BNDC if E 0 2 BNDC for all E 0 reach-
able from E .
We will also use the following characterization of P BNDC [5].
Theorem 4.16. Let E 2 E be a process. E 2 P BNDC iff for all E 0 reachable from E,
if E 0 h! E 00, then E 0 τˆ=) E 000 and E 00 nH B E 000 nH.
In order to obtain that the parallel composition CjD of secure contexts is still a
secure context we need to be able to exchange the parallel operator with the restriction
one, i.e., knowing that C[E℄ nH B C[E nH℄ nH and D[E℄ nH B D[E nH℄ nH we
want to obtain that (C[E℄jD[E℄)nH B (C[E nH℄jD[E nH℄)nH. Such property holds
for P BNDC processes as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.17. Let E;F;G;K 2 P BNDC. If E nH B F nH and GnH B K nH, then
(EjG)nH B (F jK)nH.
Proof. Consider the following binary relation:
S = f((EjG)nH;(FjK)nH ) jE;F;G;K 2 P BNDC
and E nH B F nH;GnH B K nHg:
It is easy to prove that S is a weak bisimulation. The only non-trivial case is the
synchronization on high actions. Assume that (EjG) nH τ! (E 0jG0) nH with E h! E 0
and G
¯h
!G0. Since E;G2 P BNDC, by Theorem 4.16 we have E τˆ) E 00 with E 0 nH B
E 00 nH, and G τˆ) G00 with G0 nH B G00 nH. So, E nH
τˆ
) E 00 nH and GnH τˆ)G00 nH.
By hypothesis, we obtain F nH τˆ) F 0 nH with F 0 nH B E 00 nH and K nH
τˆ
) K0 nH
with K0 nH B G00 nH. Hence, (F jK)nH
τˆ
) (F 0jK0)nH with E 0;G0;F 0;K0 2 P BNDC,
E 0 nH B F 0 nH, and G0 nH B K0 nH, i.e. ((E 0jG0)nH;(F 0jK0)nH) 2 S .
The previous lemma suggests that if we restrict to contexts mapping P BNDC pro-
cesses into P BNDC processes we obtain that the parallel composition of secure con-
texts is secure.
The following definitions will be used also in the next section.
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Definition 4.18 (P -contexts). Let P be a class of processes and C[X ;Y1; : : : ;Yn℄ be
a context whose free variables are in fX ;Y1; : : : ;Yng. C[X ;Y1; : : : ;Yn℄ is said to be a
P -context with respect to X if for all E 2 P and for all F1; : : : ;Fn 2 E it holds that
C[E;F1; : : : ;Fn℄ 2 P .
Definition 4.19 (P -secure contexts). A context C[X ℄ is said to be P -secure with re-
spect to X if it is a P -context with respect to X and it is secure for P with respect to
X .
Theorem 4.20. Let C and D be two contexts which are P BNDC-secure with respect
to X. The context CjD is P BNDC-secure with respect to X.
Proof. The fact that CjD is a P BNDC-context follows from the fact that if two pro-
cesses are P BNDC, then their parallel composition is P BNDC (see [10]).
We prove that CjD is secure for P BNDC. If E 2 P BNDC, then by hypothesis we
have C[E℄nH B C[E nH℄nH and D[E℄nH B D[E nH℄nH. Moreover, since E nH
is always P BNDC we have that C[E℄;C[E nH℄;D[E℄;D[E nH℄ are P BNDC. We get
the thesis, by applying Lemma 4.17 to the four processes.
Notice that we can apply the theorem more than once, thus obtaining contexts
which involve more parallel operators mixed with other operators.
From Proposition 3.5 we have that the contexts which can be proved to be secure
using Theorem 4.20 are secure also for the subclasses of P BNDC named SBNDC (see
[8]), PP BNDC, and CP BNDC (see [5]), respectively.
EXAMPLE 4.21. Consider the programs E2 and E3 of Example 3.4. They are P BNDC,
hence by applying Theorem 4.20 we immediately get that the two contexts of Exam-
ple 3.4 are secure for these processes.
EXAMPLE 4.22. Let END 2 L be an action and E be a P BNDC process in which nei-
ther END nor END occur. Let P END be a class of P BNDC processes whose termination
is announced by the execution of an END action. Consider the context C defined as
(X jEND:E)nfENDg:
When in C we replace the variable X with a process F taken from P END we obtain that
F is executed and then E is executed, i.e., we obtain a context which behaves like a
sequential operator. From Theorem 4.20 and Proposition 3.5, we have that X jEND:E is
secure for P END. Hence, from Theorem 4.6, we obtain that C is secure for P END.
Theorem 4.20 does not provide a decidability result. In fact, to check that a context
is a P BNDC-context, in general, it is necessary to check that an infinite number of
processes are in P BNDC. The following definition characterizes a decidable class of
contexts which are P BNDC-contexts.
Definition 4.23 (The Class C p). Let C p be the class of contexts which contains all the
P BNDC processes, the variable X , Y nH and Y=H for every variable Y , and is closed
with respect to the following constructors: Y jZ, Y n v, Y [ f ℄, ∑i2I li:Zi +∑ j2J(h j:Yj +
τ:Yj), where li 2 L and h j 2 H:
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EXAMPLE 4.24. The contexts X and W nH belong to C p. Hence, by using the con-
structor `:Z1 +h:Y1 + τ:Y1, the context `:(W nH)+h:X + τ:X belongs to C p.
Theorem 4.25. If C[X ℄ 2 C p then C[X ℄ is P BNDC-secure with respect to X.
Proof. First we prove that all the contexts in C p are P BNDC-contexts. This is imme-
diate by induction on the structure of the context. In particular, the case of the non
deterministic choice can be proved using the unwinding characterization of P BNDC
presented in [5], while the case of the parallel operator is a consequence of the fact that
the parallel composition of P BNDC processes is P BNDC (see [10]).
Now we prove that all the contexts in C p are secure for P BNDC. This is immediate
by induction on the structure of the contexts. The basic steps are trivial. All inductive
steps follow by Theorem 4.6 except the parallel case, which follows from Lemma 4.17.
5 Second Instance: Trace Equivalence and Restriction
Sometimes weak bisimulation is too demanding since in some cases processes which
are not weakly bisimilar can be considered equivalent.
EXAMPLE 5.1. Consider again the process of Example 3.3. Wholesaler ltd could
imagine that people usually set cookies. Hence, it could decide to change the applet
in the following way: if the password is inserted, then the price list is given, but as an
encrypted file. The high level user has to use another program to decrypt the file and
this program does not allow to store the decryption key. In this case the price list is
given in output only through a high level action and the process E becomes
PWD SHOPKEEPER:PRICE LIST H:0+ (PROD LIST H:0+ PROD LIST L:0):
If we consider the context C1, that is X jPWD SHOPKEEPER:0; we have C1[E℄ nH 
τ:0+ PROD LIST L:0 is not weakly bisimilar to C1[E nH℄nH  PROD LIST L:0. How-
ever, the low level user cannot read the price list using this context. He can only infer
whether a high level user has used the applet to read the price list. Since everybody
knows that there exists a price list (and thus its existence is not a secret), in this case
the use of bisimulation seems too restrictive. This example recalls the work presented
in [37] where the authors claim the need to define properties in terms of sequences of
interactions (traces) between the system and the users.
In this section we consider the following instance of our security definition:  is
T (trace equivalence) and  l is  nH (restriction on high level actions). In this case a
class of contexts C is secure for a class of processes P with respect to X if
for all C[X ℄ 2 C and for all E 2 P ;C[E℄nH T C[E nH℄nH:
In the rest of this section we refer to this instance of our security property.
EXAMPLE 5.2. Consider the context C1 and the process E of Example 5.1. Using the
above instance of our security notion, C1 is secure for E with respect to X .
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Let us consider the security property known as NDC (see [8]) which is defined
similarly to BNDC, but using trace equivalence instead of weak bisimulation.
Definition 5.3 (NDC). Let E 2 E . E 2 NDC if for all Π 2 EH ,
E nH T (EjΠ)nH:
The NDC security property is decidable as it immediately follows from the follow-
ing characterization, whose proof can be found in [8].
Lemma 5.4. Let E 2 E . E 2 NDC iff E=H T E nH:
As in the case of BNDC, it is possible to prove that all the contexts of the form X jΠ
with Π 2 EH are secure for NDC processes.
Lemma 5.5. Let E 2 E . E 2 NDC iff C[E℄nH T C[E nH℄nH for all contexts C[X ℄
X jΠ with Π 2 EH .
Proof. ()) If E 2 NDC, then we have (EjΠ)nH T E nH. Moreover, E nH is always
in NDC and E nH nH T E nH, and then (E nHjΠ)T E nH. Hence (EjPi)nH T
(E nHjΠ)nH, by transitivity of T .
(() Since E nH is always in NDC and E nH nH T E nH, we obtain (EjΠ)nH T
(E nHjΠ)nH T E nH.
In the next subsection we study contexts which are secure, using this second in-
stance, for all the processes. Then in Subsection 5.2 we concentrate on the contexts
secure for the class of NDC processes.
5.1 T Instance: Secure Contexts for a generic class P
Since trace equivalence is less demanding than weak bisimulation we immediately
obtain that the contexts which were secure in the previous section are secure also in
this section.
Theorem 5.6. Let C be a class of contexts and P be a class of processes.
If C[E℄nH B C[E nH℄nH for all C[X ℄ 2 C and for all E 2 P , then C[E℄nH T
C[E nH℄nH for all C[X ℄ 2 C and for all E 2 P .
Proof. Immediate consequence of the fact that if E B F then E T F , for all E;F 2
E .
This means that the class of contexts of Theorem 4.6 and the class C s are secure for
a generic class P of processes also with the second instance of our definition. The next
theorem shows that we can enlarge the class of secure contexts for any P .
Theorem 5.7. Let P be a class of processes and X be a variable. A context of the form
∑i2I Ci +∑h j2H h j:D j is secure for P with respect to X if Ci is secure for P with respect
to X for all i 2 I.
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Proof. Let E be a process in P . From the fact that all the Ci are secure for P we obtain
that for all i 2 I it holds Ci[E℄nH T Ci[E nH℄nH. We proceed by exploiting the fact
that T is a congruence with respect to the non deterministic choice operator, and the
restriction operator commutes with the non deterministic choice. Hence we obtain
∑
i2I
(Ci[E℄nH)T ∑
i2I
(Ci[E nH℄nH);
and so (∑i2I Ci[E℄)nH T (∑i2I Ci[E nH℄)nH.
It trivially holds that (∑h j2H h j:D j[E℄)nHT 0T (∑h j2H h j:D j[E nH℄)nH. Hence
(∑i2I Ci[E℄+∑h j2H h j:D j[E℄)nH T (∑i2I Ci[E nH℄+∑h j2H h j:D j[E nH℄)nH, i.e. our
thesis.
Notice that, also in this case it does not hold that if C and D are secure for P , then
CjD is secure for P . The contexts and the process presented in Example 4.7 witness
this fact.
5.2 T Instance: Secure Contexts for NDC processes
Here we rediscover the analogues of the results proved in Subsection 4.2 for P BNDC
processes, in the case of NDC processes. In particular, the following lemma corre-
sponds to Lemma 4.17.
Lemma 5.8. Let E;F;G;K 2 NDC. If E nH T F nH and G nH T K nH, then
(EjG)nH T (F jK)nH.
Proof. The following points are proved by Focardi and Gorrieri:
(1) if E;G 2 NDC, then EjG 2 NDC;
(2) (EjG)=H T E=HjG=H;
(3) if E 0 T F 0 and G0 T K0, then E 0jG0 T F 0jK0.
Hence we obtain
(EjG)nH T by (1) and Lemma 5.4
(EjG)=H T by (2)
(E=HjG=H) T by Lemma 5.4 and (3)
(F=HjK=H) T by (2)
(F jK)=H T by (1) and Lemma 5.4
(F jK)nH:
This allows us to obtain the following result which states that contexts obtained
using the parallel operator are secure for NDC processes when the two contexts which
are put in parallel are secure and map NDC processes into NDC processes. We recall
that, by Definition 4.19, a context C[X ℄ is said to be NDC-secure with respect to X if it
is a NDC-context with respect to X and it is secure for NDC with respect to X .
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Theorem 5.9. Let C and D be two contexts which are NDC-secure with respect to X.
The context CjD is NDC-secure with respect to X.
Proof. The fact that CjD is a NDC-context follows from the fact that if two processes
are NDC, then their parallel composition is NDC.
We prove that CjD is secure for NDC. If E 2 NDC, then by hypothesis we have
C[E℄ nH T C[E nH℄ nH and D[E℄ nH T D[E nH℄ nH. Moreover, since E nH is
always NDC we have that C[E℄;C[E nH℄;D[E℄;D[E nH℄ are NDC. We get the thesis
by applying Lemma 5.8 to these four processes.
Theorem 5.9 does not provide a decidability result. In the following definition we
characterize a decidable class of NDC-contexts, which is the analogue of the class C p
of Definition 4.23.
Definition 5.10 (The Class Cn). Let Cn be the class of contexts which contains all the
NDC processes, the variable X , Y nH and Y=H for every variable Y , and is closed with
respect to the following constructors: `:Y with ` 2 L, Y jZ, Y nv, Y [ f ℄, Y +Z, h:Y + τ:Y
with h 2 H:
Theorem 5.11. If C[X ℄ 2 Cn then C[X ℄ is NDC-secure with respect to X.
Proof. First we prove that all the contexts in Cn are NDC-contexts. This is immediate
by induction on the structure of the context. In particular, we use the fact that trace
equivalence is a congruence with respect to non deterministic choice, the fact that if
E;F 2 NDC then EjF;E nH 2 NDC.
Now we prove that all the contexts in Cn are secure for NDC. This is immediate by
induction on the structure of the context. The basic steps are trivial. As weak bisimu-
lation implies trace equivalence, all the inductive steps follow by Theorem 4.6 except
cases of parallel and nondeterministic choice. The parallel step follows by Lemma 5.8.
Finally, let C[X ℄ and D[X ℄ be secure for NDC, i.e. Tr(C[E℄ nH) = Tr(C[E nH℄ nH)
and Tr(D[E℄nH) = Tr(D[E nH℄nH) for all E 2 NDC, then for all E 2 NDC:
Tr((C[E℄+D[E℄)nH) = Tr((C[E℄nH)+(D[E℄nH))
= Tr(C[E℄nH)[Tr(D[E℄nH)
= Tr(C[E nH℄nH)[Tr(D[E nH℄nH)
= Tr(C[E nH℄+D[E nH℄)
so we conclude that C[X ℄+D[X ℄ is secure for NDC.
6 Related Works
Since the seminal work by Goguen and Meseguer [11], noninterference has played a
central role in the formalization of the notion of confidentiality. Nevertheless, many
authors notice that it is too demanding when dealing with practical applications indeed
no real policy ever calls for total absence of information flow over any channel. In
many practical applications confidential data can flow from high to low provided that
the flow is not direct and it is controlled by the system, i.e., a trusted part of the system
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can control the downgrading of high level information. Consider for instance the case
in which the high level user edits a file and sends it through a private channel to an
encrypting protocol, the encrypting protocol encrypts the file and sends it using a public
channel. Even if the high level data are sent using a public channel the fact that the file
is encrypted ensures that the low level users cannot read the data. In fact, the low level
users can only observe that an encrypted file is passing on the public channel. In this
case the encrypting protocol represents the trusted part of the system which controls
the flow from high to low.
The problem of detecting only uncontrolled information flows has first been con-
sidered by Goguen and Meseguer in [12]. They introduce the notion of conditional
noninterference which admits flow from high to low level through a controlled chan-
nel. Rushby in [29] develops a theory of downgrading in the deterministic case based
on the notion of intransitive noninterference. Pinsky in [26] unifies the concepts of
standard and intransitive noninterference and describes a decision procedure for non-
interference. In [27] a formalization of intransitive noninterference in the context of
deterministic CSP is presented. In [33] the relationships between various definitions
of noninterference and notions of process equivalence are analyzed and some general-
izations to handle partial and conditional information flows are outlined. The authors
provide a general definition of noninterference and discuss how such a generalization
could be appropriate to deal with realistic practical situations, e.g., with policies that al-
low for automatic downgrading of certain statistical information from a database. Our
definition follows the spirit of [31, 33] and generalizes the formalization presented in
those papers by allowing the use of more structured contexts and not considering only
trace-based equivalences.
Another approach to the problem of achieving noninterference in real systems is
presented in [7] where a probabilistic framework is used to give a quantitative esti-
mate of the information flowing through the systems. The authors use a parameterized
behavioral equivalence to consider as effectively noninterfering two distinguishable
behaviors provided that their difference is below a threshold ε. We can handle this
idea just instantiating our notion of secure context with their parameterized behavioral
equivalence. The presence of contexts in our definition allows the treatment of cases
in which the similarity between two processes strongly depends on the environment in
which they evolve.
In [17, 18], Martinelli observes that security properties can be naturally described
as properties of open systems, i.e., systems which may have unspecified components.
These may be used to represent a hostile intruder whose behavior cannot be predicted
or a malicious system component. The verification mechanism proposed by Martinelli
consists of checking that, for any instance of the unknown component, the resulting
system satisfies a property expressed as a formula of a suitable temporal logic. In
order to make decidable the verification problem, he does not consider constructs for
modelling recursion. He also studies a method for finding, if it exists, a suitable system
to be inserted into an unspecified component so that the whole system respects a given
specification. In [17], it is also proposed a generalization of Focardi and Gorrieri’s
Non Deducibility on Composition (NDC and BNDC) by parameterizing the equivalence
relation over processes. In our work we endorse this idea of generalizing NDC and we
extend it by parameterizing also the power of an external observer (by introducing the
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concept of low level view) and the power of a generic attacker (by introducing the
context).
Secure contexts are also studied by Sabelfeld and Mantel in [34] where they pro-
pose a timing-sensitive security definition for programs in a simple multi-threaded lan-
guage. Sabelfeld and Mantel give a syntactic characterization of a class of contexts in
their language which preserve security, i.e., they are secure whenever one substitutes
holes with secure programs. This, in a sense, corresponds to our general definition
of P -secure contexts. In particular, their definition of secure contexts is based on a
“hook-up” (compositionality) property [19] of their notion of security. That is contexts
just reflect the compositionality property of their security notion. Actually the compo-
sitionality of security properties is a fundamental issue in the incremental definition of
secure systems (see [22, 39, 36]). As we point out in the previous sections there is a
strong relation between the compositionality properties of a class P of processes and
the compositionality properties of P -secure contexts (see Theorem 4.20).
In [24] admissible interference (AI) is introduced as a trace based generalization of
SNNI [8] to deal with downgrading. In [15] a bisimulation based version of AI, named
BNAI, is presented and applied to the analysis of cryptographic protocols. Like in our
approach, their basic model is a variant of CCS. This facilitates the comparison with
our work as shown below.
6.1 Persistent Secure Contexts and Downgrading
In order to model the notion of downgrading in our language we need to introduce the
set of actions performed by the trusted downgrader, i.e., we assume that L is partitioned
into the sets D (downgrading actions), H, and L. In the following we denote by H+ the
set H[D. It is reasonable to assume that an attacker cannot simulate the trusted part of
the system, i.e., it cannot perform the actions in D. For instance, in the case of protocol
analysis the attacker cannot distribute the encryption keys. Moreover, we can assume
that the low level users cannot observe the actions performed by the trusted part. These
considerations can be translated in our framework as follows:
 the class C of contexts in which we are interested has to be a subset of the set CH
of all contexts built using only actions in H;
 the operation l has to remove all the behaviors relative to actions in H+.
In particular, if we consider our first instance, i.e., using weak bisimulation and restric-
tion, and we focus on the class of contexts CBNDC = fX jΠ jΠ 2 EHg (i.e, the contexts
used to define BNDC) we get that a process E has to satisfy
(EjΠ)nH+ B (E nH+ jΠ)nH+
for all Π 2 EH .
EXAMPLE 6.1. Let us consider the case in which an encrypting protocol receives a
confidential file on a private channel, encrypts it and sends the resulting file on a public
channel. Let f ileh be the high level input representing the reception of the file on the
private channel, encd be the downgrading action representing the encryption phase, okh
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be a confidential acknowledge to the high level user, and f ilel be the low level output
of the encrypted data. The encrypting protocol can be formalized as
Enc f ileh:encd :okh: f ilel :0
Since it is reasonable to assume that an attacker cannot simulate the trusted part of the
system, i.e., it cannot perform the actions in D, if we consider any possible attacker
Π 2 EH we get that
(EncjΠ)nH+ B 0B (E nH+jΠ)nH+
which means that Enc is secure.
Unfortunately imposing that E satisfies
(EjΠ)nH+ B (E nH+jΠ)nH+
is not enough to guarantee no information flow. In fact, all the (uncontrolled) flows
which occur after the first downgrading are not revealed. This problem was observed
also in [24]. As done in [24, 15] we can check the flows occurring after the first
downgrading by imposing persistency.
Definition 6.2 (Persistent-secure Contexts for a Process). A class of contexts C is
persistent-secure for a process E iff for all E 0 reachable from E , C is secure for E 0.
Applying this definition to weak bisimulation and restriction with respect to H+,
and considering the class of contexts CBNDC we get that a process E has to be such that
for all E 0 reachable from E it holds
(E 0jΠ)nH+ B (E 0 nH+jΠ)nH+
EXAMPLE 6.3. Let us consider again the encrypting protocol Enc above, it reaches the
process E 0  okh: f ilel :0 which does not satisfy
(E 0jΠ)nH+ B (E 0 nH+jΠ)nH+
In fact if Π  okh:0 then (E 0jΠ) nH+ B f ilel :0; while (E 0 nH+jΠ) nH+ B 0: This
means that the low level user which observes the encrypted file passing on the public
channel can infer that the high level user has received the acknowledge. We can avoid
this kind of flow by adding a timeout to the protocol
Enc f ileh:encd:(okh: f ilel :0+ τ: f ilel :0):
Now the process is secure.
The BNAI property introduced in [15] corresponds to consider l equal to nH+, 
equal to B, and the class of contexts CBNAI of the form (X nD)=H. A process E is
BNAI if and only if CBNAI is persistent-secure for E . We can prove that this is equivalent
to consider the class of contexts CBNDC.
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7 Conclusions
We presented a generalization of the notions of noninterference which is more flexible
than the ones introduced by Focardi and Gorrieri [8]. The flexibility is a consequence
of the fact that our notion is parametric with respect to a class of contexts and thus not
limited to contexts of the form X jΠ, with Π 2 EH .
On the one hand our notion can be used to restrict the set of possible attackers: e.g.,
when it is not reasonable to assume that an attacker has the ability to perform any high
level action. This occurs in many practical applications. On the other hand our notion
allows us to enlarge the set of possible attackers, since contexts can also perform low
level actions and SPA operators can be freely combined in the context construction.
As noted by other authors (see, e.g., [8, 33, 17]) the notion of noninterference
strongly depends on the notion of process equivalence. But the problem of characteriz-
ing the behavioral equality between two processes is not trivial in a non-deterministic
system. In fact, there is no notion of system equivalence which everybody agrees upon,
the choice of the appropriate notion of equivalence depends on the environment and ap-
plication which are considered. The equivalence can be chosen among, for example,
trace or failure equivalence, various forms of bisimulation and testing equivalence. Our
notion is parametric with respect to the relational equivalence among processes, hence
it can be specified in order to fit the right idea of process equality in various contexts
of study.
In modelling real systems we cannot ignore the abilities of the low level observer.
This is captured in our approach by parameterizing also the low level view in order to
fit the situation in the real systems.
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Prefix
 
a:E a! E
Sum
E1
a
! E 01
E1 +E2
a
! E 01
E2
a
! E 02
E1 +E2
a
! E 02
Parallel
E1
a
! E 01
E1jE2
a
! E 01jE2
E2
a
! E 02
E1jE2
a
! E1jE 02
E1
`
! E 01 E2
¯
`
! E 02
E1jE2
τ
! E 01jE 02
Restriction
E a! E 0
E n v a! E 0 n v
if a 62 v
Relabelling
E a! E 0
E[ f ℄ f (a)! E 0[ f ℄
Recursion
T [recZ:T [Z℄℄ a! E 0
recZ:T [Z℄ a! E 0
Table 1: The operational rules for SPA
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Figure 1: The Database example.
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